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Floating down the River: Vietnamese Community-led Social Innovation
Abstract
Purpose: The paper explores the barriers facing social enterprise led community energy projects in 
Vietnam, to understand the barriers and enablers of social innovation in transitioning economies. In 
doing so the research seeks to identify whether the Vietnamese ecosystem is conducive to sustainable 
community energy projects and social innovation more broadly.
Design/Methodology/Approach: The research utilised a qualitative, case-study based methodology to 
explore institutional barriers to social innovation in the context of three community-led energy 
projects in Northern Vietnam. Interviews and focus groups were undertaken with 17 individual 
stakeholders within or engaged with the three case-studies. The qualitative data utilised was analysed 
utilising Constant Comparative Method, a method of analysis based in Grounded Theory that allows 
for iterative analysis of the data gathered.
Findings: Social enterprises and their beneficiaries are reliant on their ability to network, but with the 
Vietnamese government actively involved in the markets there are significant barriers standing in the 
way of these networking opportunities. Communities with little political capital are alienated from 
state institutions, whilst enterprises that offer alternative solutions to governmental priorities, are 
seen as competitors by political agents.
Originality/Value: Applying Granovetter’s theory of ‘embeddedness’ and Herold et al. (2019) and 
Popov et al.’s (2016) theories on institutional centrality and power distribution, this paper seeks to 
add to our understanding on the impact large, hegemonic institutions can have on the networking 
ability of social enterprises and their beneficiaries.
Key Words
Embeddedness; Social Enterprise; Social Innovation; Networks; Community Energy.
Introduction
Electricity usage in Vietnam has grown rapidly in recent times, whereas in 1990 only 54% of the 
population had access to power, that figure now stands at 98% with the country becoming a net 
importer to meet demand (Urban, 2018). The increase in energy consumption has primarily been 
driven by the states adoption of the 1986 Doi Moi economic reforms, which saw the planned economy 
transition toward liberalisation (Hansen, 2017). In order to control the outcomes of liberalisation, the 
state has primarily aimed investment into cities, with urban areas benefiting from being close to both 
economic and political centres of power (Thayer, 2009). The state has, however, also made great 
efforts in rural electrification, with 95% of rural households having access to electricity by 2008 
(Nguyen et al, 2019). Despite these achievements, energy poverty is still a reality for communities 
either disenfranchised by the state, or living in areas where it is unable to build a suitable energy 
infrastructure, for example, in mountainous regions. 
Social enterprises have sought to resolve this problem through the process of social innovation, in 
particular the implementation of small scale community-funded renewable energy projects. The 
literature on the implementation of such projects has expanded greatly, with particular focus on the 
relationship between the technology, local community and wider society (Wirth, 2013; Maruyama, 
































































2007; May and Diesendorf, 2018; Kooji et al., 2018).  A regular issue raised in the literature is the 
barriers to success when trying to community energy projects in areas where there are vested 
interests (Kooij et al., 2018). In the case of Vietnam, the dual approach of market liberalisation 
combined with one-party political control has created an ecosystem whereby personal and business 
networks have become key to success, granting as they do patronage and access to resources (fiscal 
and otherwise). In doing so, the paper seeks to present a picture of how community-led renewable 
energy projects can emerge and succeed in transitional economies, despite ‘embedded’ structures of 
inequality and vested interests being present.
This paper adopts a theoretical framework centred on Granovetter’s work on embeddedness (1985) 
and social structures (2005), and how these shape economic outcomes. Further, the paper aligns this 
with Weber’s (1978) work on power, and how access to resources shapes individuals’ (and hence a 
community’s) ability to engage in social action. These dual theoretical approaches are embedded 
within a wider discussion of institutional factors with regards to institution centrality and stakeholder 
salience (Herold et al., 2019), as well as offering a critique of institutional models that suggest 
asymmetrical distributions of power are ‘accidental’ (Popov et al., 2016). Instead, this paper argues 
that such power imbalances are purposely built into socioeconomic systems, as a means to control 
resource flow. The paper therefore makes a significant and original contribution to knowledge in the 
areas of community-funded renewable energy and social enterprise ecosystem development, by 
demonstrating how institutional barriers and embeddedness within social networks, shape the forms 
of social innovation that emerge.
Social Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship Globally
Heiskala (2007:519) defined social innovation as “changes in the cultural, normative or regulative 
structures [or classes] of the society which enhance its collective power resources and improve its 
economic and social performance”. The role of social innovation can therefore be seen as one of 
empowerment, with a specific focus on those individuals/communities that are socially 
disadvantaged. Social innovation can emerge as products/services, marketplaces and/or processes 
(Nicholls and Ziegler, 2014) and varies across different regional and national contexts (Bacq and 
Janssen, 2011; Mulgan, 2006). In Asia generally the most prominent emergent form of social 
innovations are social enterprises (Sengupta and Sahay, 2017), defined as self-sustainable market-
based organisations that seek to reduce social inequality (Dart, Clow and Armstrong, 2010; Nicholls, 
2007). However, when defining social innovation, it is important to recognise that social enterprise 
constitutes only one type of innovation, and that others exist. Indeed, social innovations can emerge 
from civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations, higher education, government and private sector 
stakeholders (Murray, Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2010). 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to better understand how the emergence of social 
innovations (and specifically community-led social enterprises) are constrained by wider ecosystem 
factors, specifically in relation to institutional constraints. Whilst prior research has demonstrated the 
high levels of impact delivered by bottom-up social innovations globally (Kruse et al., 2014), the reality 
in different regions is that social innovation as an ecosystem can be often overly driven (and 
constrained) by top-down factors. Given that the role of social innovations are to change cultural, 
normative and regulative structures in society (Heiskala, 2007), there is therefore a potential systemic 
bias within countries or ecosystems to inhibit the emergence of said innovations. Such bias can 
translate into a lack of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) for social innovators within systems that are 
unfavourable to social innovation. Certainly, from a Weberian perspective, dominant stakeholders can 
use institutional mechanisms to limit the social action of others, in order to prevent systemic change 
from occurring (Weber, 1978). Furthermore, the work of Popov et al. (2016) has demonstrated that 
‘accidental’ factors can also institutionally constrain social innovators, through institutional 
































































dysfunctions inherent to the country in question. Therefore, from an institutional perspective, 
institutional barriers within the ecosystem could exist both by deliberate design and due to 
inefficiencies. Nevertheless, it must be noted that institutions are not islands within society, but rather 
are actively shaped by the stakeholders that engage with them (Herold et al., 2019); the institutional 
logics that can constrain social innovation are themselves the result of stakeholder actions. This means 
that social innovation is shaped in a continuous cycle of institutional and stakeholder interaction. 
Globally, social innovations and social enterprise have emerged as potential solutions to societal 
problems, driven by an increased focus on how to alleviate the social problems that have arisen and 
appear to be unsolvable using traditional market and public sector models. Whilst it is important not 
to underplay the localised and culturally relativistic nature of many social innovations, it is also critical 
to recognise that its emergence is based within the emergence of supra-national social norms (Do and 
Fernandes, 2020). Indeed, models of social innovation such as social enterprise can be argued to be 
both the result of globalisation and the spread of ideas, as well as localised resistance to the 
disempowerment felt by many communities due to globalisation (Author’s Own). The emergence of 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) from which SDG7 (Affordable and Clean 
Energy) is most pertinent to this study, has helped to solidify this growth. Prior research (Eichler and 
Schwarz, 2019) has also identified the relativistic nature of social innovations globally through the SDG 
framework, with the focus of social innovations in developing countries generally being tied to SDG1: 
No Poverty, SDG3: Good Health and Wellbeing, and SDG4: Quality Education, and SDG8: Decent Work 
and Economic Growth; whilst in developed countries the focus has been centred on SDG11: 
Sustainable Cities and Communities, SDG3: Good Health and Well-Being and SDG10: Reduced 
Inequalities1. 
The development of supportive ecosystems for social innovation has been typified as being centred 
on strong stakeholder networks (Horgan and Dimitrijević, 2018), with low-power distance and 
pluralistic flows of resources (Author’s Own). Further, the distribution of power within these networks 
and the way that this shapes resource flow is directly related to the strength of the ecosystem 
(Author’s Own). Supportive ecosystems are also critical in delivering social innovations centred on 
energy justice (Hiteva and Sovacool, 2017), as the empowerment of communities through bottom-up 
social innovation is vital to the emergence and growth of community energy systems (Koirala et al., 
2018). This refers to what Mulgan (2019:64) identified as the ‘power test’, whereby social innovation 
empowers people and they feel this empowerment. This type of bottom-up social innovation in the 
development of community energy projects is important precisely because it empowers communities 
to move from being passive consumers to active stakeholders (ibid), allowing socially disadvantaged 
individuals to engage in social action to direct social change. In addition, the role of ecosystem 
conditions could be posited to be very influential in this area, given that the SI Drive ‘Atlas of Social 
Innovation’ identifies only 44 social innovation projects worldwide focused on ‘Energy Collectives’ and 
‘Energy Services’, with 41 of these being based in Europe (SI Drive, 2020)2. Within the Vietnamese 
context, the ‘imap’ of social innovation created by National Economics University in Hanoi, identifies 
only 32 energy and clean technology social innovations in Vietnam, all of which are based in the major 
urban conurbations of Hanoi (N=24), Ho Chi Minh City (N=5) and Danang (N=3) (NEU, 2020). However, 
given the aforementioned importance of stakeholder networks and institutional logics in the 
development of social innovation, how can the very communities that do not have access to said 
networks/institutions be empowered to solve their own energy needs?
1 Globally it is highly probably that we will see a larger focus on SDG3 Good Health and Wellbeing in both 
developed and developing countries moving forwards with the Covid-19 outbreak still ongoing at the time of 
writing.
2 Whilst we would not argue that SI Drive provides a comprehensive overview of global social innovations, it is 
interesting that their mapping has not identified any such projects in Asia and more specifically Vietnam (the 
three non-European social innovation projects were in Africa (N=2) and South America (N=1).
































































Economic Embeddedness and Institutional Theory
Originally writing in 1973, Granovetter proposed two forms of the socio-economic network, strong 
and weak. The strong-network is made up of our strong, interpersonal relationships, which play a 
significant role in the creation of economic structures. The role of the strong-network occurs because 
the trust that comes with familiarity, offsets the risk of attracting ‘free-riders’ in groups, or individuals 
trying to benefit from a project without contributing (Granovetter, 2005). Building on this, Marsden 
and Campbell (1984) studied what the best indicator of a strong tie was, with ‘emotional closeness’ 
considered to be the most important factor in the development of the strong-network, over and above 
the amount of time of connected, intimacy (mutual confiding) and reciprocal services (Marsden and 
Campbell, 1984). We can see this manifest in the creation of group identities that community groups 
adopt when organising themselves to combat local energy issues. The denser the strong-network, the 
more protected it becomes from subversive messages, as nodes within the network repeatedly assert 
shared ideas and norms, reaffirming the proper way to behave within the community. This closeness 
allows the networked nodes to identify repeated problems that the community suffers from and work 
together in an attempt to develop the tools to fix them (Yalcin-Riollett et al., 2014). However, as the 
strong-network is built on shared social situations, the information from where solutions can be 
derived is limited due to the similarity of experiences. This can act to constrain social innovation and 
consequently the emergence of new solutions to problems (i.e. social enterprise), as the group 
becomes closed off to alternative influences. Therefore, if the strong-network is unable to use its own 
tools to solve a problem (and recognises this), it will look outwards towards its weak-network for 
inspiration (Granovetter, 2005).
This research develops Granovetter’s embeddedness in line with the institutional theory hypothesised 
by Herold et al. (2019) whom combined institutional/stakeholder theory when investigating carbon 
disclosure strategies (Herold et al., 2019). Herold’s work indicated that although stakeholders and 
companies are treated separately within different theoretical frames, the former have the ability to 
enforce their will on the latter if controlling material or financial resources. This is particularly salient 
within the Vietnamese social innovation climate, as external societal stakeholders are able to control 
market outcomes due to their much stronger influence on the state’s economic and political networks 
then would be expected elsewhere. However, the current research suggests that as opposed to the 
monopolisation of power being incidental due to bad system design, as suggested in the work of Popov 
et al. (2016), the asymmetrical distribution of power is purposively built into Vietnamese networks 
(Popov et al., 2016). This relates to prior research around social innovation in general, which identifies 
barriers to resources (financial, political, intellectual, legal and human) as critical in enabling or stifling 
the emergence of innovations (Oeij et al., 2019). 
Vietnam therefore offers a unique example of Granovetter’s theory of embeddedness, as the 
influence of the Vietnamese Communist Party in the country’s networks and the development of a 
state-centric economy (albeit built on market-liberalisation) has impacted upon what information gets 
shared, and who has the right to access it. The country also demonstrates how social networks in 
transitional economies can embed power disparities and further exclude already socially 
disadvantaged societies, if pluralising economic forces are not allowed to develop. Indeed, from a 
Weberian perspective (1978) this social embeddedness within the economy allows dominant actors 
to shape social action towards their own ends, and to prevent others from improving their own 
economic positions. However, to develop an embedded understanding of the community-led 
renewable energy market in Vietnam, it is first important to understand the Vietnamese economic 
context itself.
The Vietnamese Context
































































In 1986, Vietnam adopted the Doi Moi policies of economic reform as the state attempted to avert 
growing hardship by moving away from a centrally managed system into one driven by the markets. 
In order to protect its citizens from the risks of structural adjustment, therefore preserving its 
legitimacy as the protector of the people, the Vietnamese state built its new economic model on the 
foundations of its traditional political network, trusting governmental actors and political allies to put 
policy before growth (Thayer, 2009; Gamble, 2011). This patronage based system pulled much of the 
newly opened markets into the state’s ‘strong-network’, with key actors ensuring that although the 
network would be dense, there would remain a top-down approach to power, with participants 
repeatedly seeing requests for preferred behaviours from a government willing to prosecute those 
who they considered to have mismanaged a state asset or chosen profit over the delivery of 
government policy (Nguyen, 2017). This controlled development of market liberalisation in Vietnam 
has caused the ev lution of capitalism to be uneven, with researchers identifying three different 
economic systems operating across the country, namely: state capitalism; crony capitalism; and 
socialism. This has made it difficult for investors and enterprises to navigate properly, or partner with 
enterprises in other geographic areas who have different market experiences (Ngo and Tarko, 2017).
This development of the Vietnamese markets has largely influenced the behaviours of foreign 
investors, who traditionally offer a substantial source of funding for both social enterprises and other 
third sector/Non-Governmental Organisations (Dupuy et al., 2016). Investment freedom in Vietnam is 
poor, far below the world average in the 2019 Economic Freedom of the World Index (Vietnam is 
ranked 128th of 180), with the state restricting various sectors of the economy (Index of Economic 
Freedom, 2019; Gamble, 2011). The difficulties in investing in the Vietnamese market have been 
partially offset by the creation of enterprise incubators that allow investors access to the countries 
small and medium businesses, including social enterprises. However, as these incubators are driven 
by societal stakeholders who are able to influence investor strategy, groups pursuing innovations that 
fall outside government policy, experience difficulty in gaining financial or business support. This 
creates an environment for social innovations that is sub-optimal and communities (and the social 
enterprises seeking to support them) from gaining institutional support and access to key stakeholder 
networks. This means that those with power can distort narratives to fit their own agendas, and that 
those without access to networks and resources (i.e. the socially disadvantaged) have their ability to 
engage in community-led renewable energy projects (social action) limited (Granovetter, 1985, 2005; 
Weber, 1978). This monopoly of power through social netw rks (both weak and strong) creates 
isomorphic tendencies within the ecosystem, as stakeholders are forced to conform or disappear.
This review has shown how the economic structure of the state can limit innovation when pluralisation 
is not pursued, with tensions created through the juxtaposition of state political control and increasing 
economic liberalism. This paper seeks to argue that whereas social enterprises have traditionally 
offered a means to overcome this inequality, the setup of the Vietnamese economy has raised 
barriers, significantly impacting their work. This is an important facet to understand, as the hybrid 
nature of social enterprises with their duality of social and economic missions, alongside their desire 
to empower the disadvantaged (Doherty, Haugh and Lyon, 2014; Douglas, 2015), makes their work 
crucial in the betterment of the lives of communities with little social, cultural or economic capital. 
The ability to connect the political, social, and economic spheres of the ecosystem enables social 
enterprises to reduce power-distance3 between communities and the state; whilst developing an 
understanding of how hegemonic institutions can affect the ability of social enterprises to empower 
communities, increases our knowledge of how power relations shape ecosystem development beyond 
the borders of Vietnam.
3 Puumalainen et al. (2015) characterise high power-distance as a system in which large amounts of power are 
concentrated in the hands of a few actors.

































































The research sought to ascertain the perspectives of stakeholders involved within three case-studies 
on the issues and barriers that they faced in developing community-led solutions. Specifically, the 
research sought to answer the following two research questions:
RQ1: How can the economic and political ecosystem of Vietnam complement the 
development of sustainable community energy focused social enterprises?
RQ2: What are social or environmental factors that need to be addressed to allow for the 
successful implementation of social innovation within Vietnam?
The research adopted a qualitative methodological approach within a case-study paradigm, in which 
three purposefully selected case-studies were identified and selected for the research: one case-study 
was based in Hanoi; whilst the other two were based on Cat Ba Island, the largest island in the Cat Ba 
Archipelago (UNESCO, 2019). Yin (2014) identifies case-study research as providing a research 
approach whereby in-depth exploration of rich data can provide new theoretical insights that can be 
used to generalise in relation to specific phenomenon. Given that our access to potential case-study 
sites was limited, coupled with the nascent state of the community-led renewable energy sector in 
Vietnam, the opportunity to explore a small number of projects in-depth to generate new theoretical 
insights, provided a robust alignment with our research aims. Further, Yin (1994) also argues that case-
study research is best preceded by an empirical and theoretical understanding of the field gained 
through a literature review, and aligned with an analytical framework. This aligns with the Straussian 
grounded theory approach adopted in this study, in which we sought to identify qualitative themes 
that were grounded in the experience of the participants (bottom-up), but in which our initial thinking 
was informed by the prior literature and academic theory (top-down) (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).
 
A purposeful sampling technique also allowed engagement with people deliberately based upon their 
perceived expertise, knowledge and experience in relation to the phenomenon being explored 
(Higginbottom, 1994). The case-studies were selected at the local, community level; that is, each case-
study represented a specific local community that experienced problems and for whom working with 
social enterprises or other partners had presented them with renewable solutions to their energy 
needs. Within the case-studies, relevant stakeholders were engaged through semi-structured 
interviews, including: community members (the beneficiaries); the social entrepreneur and the staff 
supporting them (social enterprise); and local government/management officials (where applicable). 
In addition, the perspectives of academic experts in relation to the barriers facing community-led 
renewable energy projects were sought through a focus group, and this data is used as a point of 
triangulation between the three case-studies, so as to better understand the wider energy sector 
context in Vietnam. Table 1 below details those individuals who participated. In total, 17 individuals 
participated across the interviews and focus groups, whilst observations of the projects were also 
undertaken, so as to inform the researchers’ knowledge of the projects and their context.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Semi-structured interviews4 provide the research with a flexible tool, with which certain important 
themes identified through the literature review and the theoretical framework could be explored, but 
in which the participants were also free to explore issues of importance to them (Myers and Newman, 
2007). This allowed the research to both examine top-down theoretically derived phenomenon (Yin, 
1994), but also ensure that the bottom-up ‘grounded’ perceptions of participants were captured 
4 In some cases, recordings were not possible and instead extensive notes were taken. Quotes from these 
interviews may not be verbatim and where this is the case they will be accompanied with an asterisk.
































































(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The interviews conducted were arranged through a local university in 
Hanoi, who also provided a translator for the work carried out at the Hanoi case-study. For Cat Ba 
Island the interviews were arranged by the local university in Hanoi, as well as the management board 
of the Island, who also attended the interviews along with a representative of the local government5. 
In identifying three different case-study sites, the research was deliberately seeking to explore 
different contexts, so as to ascertain thematic commonalities that would allow for the theoretical 
generalisations espoused by Yin (2014) to be identified. A description of both case-studies is provided 
below:
Case-study 1: This case-study represents a floating village in Hanoi, made up of residents 
originally barred from living in the city having relocated from remote northern areas in the 
early 1990s. Since relocating to the Red River, the community has been actively involved in 
the cities growing informal/casual economy and is one of the beneficiaries of a green-energy 
social enterprise (SE1) who have provided the village with renewable energy systems, the 
community being isolated from the national grid. SE1 provides this service across Vietnam and 
is funded by donors and through competition wins. They have worked with the university, but 
have been unable to find wider political support for their work.
Case-study 2: This case study represents a community of pig farmers located on Cat Ba Island, 
Vietnams largest island east of Hai Phong city (Vietnam’s third largest city). The pig famers run 
small scale operations and sell their stock to slaughterhouses who provide meat to the hotels 
serving the islands growing tourist industry. They were the beneficiaries of a Biogas project 
rolled out by the local government through the farmer’s union, a system which turns the pig 
waste into gas and water. Within the research further networking was found between a 
farmer and a hotel, who provided waste food for the pigs in order for them to be considered 
organic, raising the price he could ask from the slaughterhouses.
Case-study 3: A second community engaged on the island were the farmers on floating 
fisheries, a concept developed by the government. Located off the coast of Cat Ba Island in an 
archipelago they are unable to be connected to the national grid, but due to their economic 
power they have been able to provide themselves with renewable energy systems to power 
their farms. This is due to them being able to sell their stock for inflated prices to the island’s 
hotels, though some have also developed floating hotels and tours for the islands visitors 
around the archipelago. 
The interviews were analysed utilising Constant Comparative Method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985), an iterative approach based in grounded theory and utilised for the 
qualitative analysis of text (i.e. interview transcripts) (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In CCM categories 
‘emerge’ from the interview data via inductive reasoning, rather than coding to predetermined 
categories (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). This allows the research to therefore seek bottom-up 
answers to complex questions ‘grounded’ in participants’ experience, whilst also allowing for 
theoretical and empirical information to inform the research at the pre-data gathering stage through 
a Straussian approach to grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).  Throughout the research 27 
units of analysis emerged, leading to eight categories and ultimately three themes. These themes 
5 The research team recognises the limitations of an approach whereby the beneficiaries were interviewed in 
the presence of a local government official. In order to gain access to the participants this was at points 
unavoidable, and acts as one of the significant limitations of the research. However, given the focus of this paper 
on the role of the government in shaping social innovation in Vietnam, it also offers an interesting insight into 
the ecosystem constraints that exist.
































































were: ‘The Funnelling of Investors’, ‘Monopolisation of Networking Opportunities’, and ‘Distance 
Between Social and Political Priorities’ (see Figure 1).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The Funnelling of Investors 
The social enterprise incubators in Vietnam have been set up in order to aid international investors 
who are seeking to invest in the state, by offering support and guidance in the hard to predict 
marketplace. The incubator P01 is working with is backed by both the United Kingdom and Vietnamese 
governments, and works with consortiums in the United States and Europe.
“We worked with consortiums overseas […] US, UK and some other countries……So we are 
funded by our two main donors, who are the UK government and Ho Chi Minh Government” 
(I01 - Investor). 
These partnerships add legitimacy to an incubator operating in an economy where the internal 
stakeholders are unsure of the government’s attitudes toward foreign investment and how well it is 
set-up to protect new enterprises. 
“The government needs to change their mindset” (P02 – Incubator Member)
“Our country has no industrial property protections” (P01 – Social Enterprise). 
These concerns, along with the work of Gamble (2011), Ngo and Tarko (2017) and Thayer (2009) 
indicate that the incubators, investors, and involved businesses understand that the Vietnamese 
economic environment is difficult to navigate.  This has, however, led to an asymmetrical relationship 
in terms of what each party is trying to achieve. The incubators are seeking to improve the social 
impact of the enterprises they support, and although their international partnerships have allowed 
them to invite experts in to help create support and knowledge networks, their partners are driven by 
profit.
“They’d prefer to do other business to earn easy money” (P02 – Incubator Member)
“We give seed funding to a lot of enterprises. We set goals and if they meet them they can get 
further funding and we will take equity in the business”* (I03 – Incubator Investor). 
 
This means that social enterprise incubators are not a system open to all, with the potential 
profitability of an investment being the primary driving factor behind any funding, something often 
not achievable for community energy projects (albeit they are often sustainable).
For enterprises such as SE1, the financial targets of the incubator system are significant barriers due 
to their primacy of their social missions. In general terms, investors will seek to increase their returns 
on investments through price rises, cost-reduction or volume increases. The solar panels cost $170 to 
the community and many are already involved in micro-financing in order to fund the purchase, 
making price increases impractical. The costs involved with the solar panels are set due to the 
technology involved, and the wind turbine system utilises refurbished pots and pans meaning both 
systems are already at their lowest cost-points. Finally, although SE1 is interested in increasing its 
outreach, the communities that the enterprise serve remain economically weak. SE1 feels that this is 
enough to turn both the incubators and their international investors away. For the enterprise, the 
majority of investment they have received has been through donors or competition wins, which are 
sporadic in nature, leaving its future perpetually insecure. However, SE1’s reliance on the incubator 
































































to be able to access resources (financial and otherwise) means that they don’t have the power to alter 
this insecure environment.
Monopolisation of Knowledge Networks
The literature concerning community energy projects has identified that networking is driven by the 
‘natives’ who identified strategic gaps and sought out partners in order to garner ‘novel’ information 
(Yalcin-Riollett et al., 2019; Kooij et al., 2018; Sovacool and Drupady, 2012; Leal, 2011). Within the 
Vietnamese environment, however, it is suggested that this is a responsibility absorbed by the 
incubator with little upskilling of the owners of the enterprise, further exacerbating power disparities 
and exclusion from stakeholder networks:
“… our responsibilities to work with international partner […] and also looking for the investor 
to help them secure business” (I01 – Incubator Representative). 
The incubator has built its own international networks linking up with experts to support its 
enterprises, allowing their members the opportunity to better understand the markets and improve 
their products. 
“…that’s why they are also outside, to meet the potential – to see and assess the market. And 
then come back to improve their products (I01 – Incubator). 
Indeed, P01, a social enterprise, indicated that their own experiences with the incubator had led them 
and their colleagues to consider the commercialisation of their work. However, P01 wasn’t actively 
involved in their enterprise’s commercialisation, instead the incubator took responsibility for it.
“Not only protect them, but he may create for me, for example, a smaller SME or some small 
company to commercialise it” (P01 – Community Member). 
The absorption of this responsibility suggests there is little up-skilling of the enterprise managers, who 
are instead reliant on the incubator to commercialise their products. This is important in the 
Vietnamese context as it has been noted in prior research that the country’s social enterprises are 
deeply embedded within their own cultural contexts and struggle to work with international partners 
(Easter and Conway Dato-On, 2015). In order for this to change, it’s important that social enterprises 
can share knowledge with one another on how to navigate international relationships. However, this 
information is embedded into the incubator network many organisations are alienated from. Although 
incubated enterprises are able to take advantage of the knowledge pool created by the incubators, 
they are unable to disseminate that information ‘downstream’.
Seeking horizontal nodes in a weak-network (partners of equal social, political or economic standing) 
has been shown to benefit enterprises when seeking to compete with established or embedded 
powers (Kooij et al., 2018). This knowledge transfer is key in bridging the strategic gaps within 
Granovetter’s weak-networks; however, with the incubators not up-skilling their beneficiaries, SE1 is 
unable to find the information needed to bridge their gap in creating a sustainable business. This limits 
P01’s ability to share its learning with other social enterprises, creating a knowledge monopoly in the 
Vietnamese ecosystem. 
Distance Between Social and Political Priorities
The previous two themes could suggest that the asymmetrical development of the incubator network 
and the alienation of social enterprises who demonstrate low profitability, is an accidental system 
































































design as suggested in the institutional theory of Popov et al (2016), with incubators and investor 
behaviour coerced by the wider Vietnamese environment (ibid). However, an exploration of how the 
incubator operates suggests asymmetrical distribution of resources is a deliberate design. P01’s 
incubator is backed by the Ministry of Science and Technology, who’s goal it is to combat climate 
change. Due to it prioritising this, the incubator applies a top-down approach when seeking out 
enterprise partners, ensuring that potential enterprises are politically suitable. To aid this, they call 
upon experts within their network and create panels to discuss the potential of the businesses, panels 
which exclude communities themselves:
 
“We invite five or six people, one in the technical, one in the business, one in the social, one in 
the banks, investor, something like. So they come along, they sit at one table and then we 
discuss together about the potential ideas, potential of the business” (I01 - Incubator) 
This top-down approach and the alienation of the community from decision-making, is impactful on 
the enterprises that work with them and offer alternative solutions to social problems. In practice, we 
can see this impact on the work that SE1 does, along with its continued distance from local political 
actors, through its inability to gain support and funding from incubators despite delivering a 
sustainable model. The Vietnamese government has proactively worked toward green energies, and 
adopted policies to further that goal, namely ‘The Green Growth Strategy’ (2012), the ‘Green Growth 
Action Plan’ (2014), and the ‘National Strategy on Climate Change’ (2011).  Despite this, SE1 has found 
itself unable to partner with political actors in its offering of alternative energy for small communities 
disconnected to the national grid. Markard (2011) suggests that the key cause may be that as 
established technologies and practices (such as the incubators) are highly entwined with political and 
institutional practices, social enterprises like SE1 could be seen as competitors not partners.
This is further embedded into the Vietnamese environment, as access to technologies is funnelled 
through the incubators. Companies or communities who require either technology or access to a 
service supported by the incubator will post their needs on the incubator’s systems. The incubator will 
them match them with other partners they have worked with previously.
“They will post their needs or they post their technology on our system” (I01 – Incubator)
“At the same time the local company posts their needs, sometimes they need to transfer 
technology or they need the service, something like that. So we are matching them together 
so we come from both sides” (I01 – Incubator)
The technologies and partners available through the incubator system have already been through the 
political processes that allow them to access the incubation system. It was also suggested that the 
incubator may be filling one of the government’s own strategic gaps with the state’s social unions 
(government supported mass organisations) not being effective in the markets the organisation is 
involved in.
“The unions, the social union is not great, not yet, and not really works well and develops in 
Vietnam. So that’s why it’s very difficult to ask them to be involved in some kind of doing 
business like us.” (I01 – Incubator)
This is further supported by government support innovation programmes in the North of the country. 
Energy based innovations have been successful rolled out by both the farmers union and the 
government-led outreach to pig farmers, and the other farmers have been able to access similar 
technologies offered by SE1 (who don’t operate in the area) through their economic strength. 
































































“We visited the farmers and used leaflets to tell people about the projects” (G02- Government 
Official). 
Such institutional processes also create uniform logics that increase isomorphism in the ecosystem, 
with emergent homogeneity across social innovations (Herold et al., 2019). They are therefore 
excluded from the very stakeholder networks that convey resources to the ‘chosen’, and become 
effectively disembedded from economic structures (Granovetter, 2005). 
This demonstrates what can be viewed as the deliberate design of institutional systems to retain 
power within the hands of key stakeholders (namely investors, incubators/universities, and 
government), both creating institutional dysfunction (Popov et al., 2016) and increasing the power-
distance within the ecosystem (Puumalainen et al., 2015). However, contrary to Popov et al.’s (2016) 
arguments, such dysfunction is not accidental, but rather a deliberate stakeholder strategy (Herold et 
al., 2019), designed to limit the power of (and hence social action) of social innovators within the 
ecosystem. This actively constrains social innovation in Vietnam and limits the growth of social 
enterprises operating in this area.
Discussion
Through Granovetter’s (2005) theoretical lens of “embeddedness”, this paper has sought to explore 
whether Vietnam’s economy is complementary to the development of successful and sustainable 
community energy social enterprises, and whether any social or environmental factors needed to be 
addressed. The research presented seeks to add to our understanding of the impact a large and 
politically powerful node, can have on the ability of groups to traverse their weak-network as potential 
partners and nodes react to accommodate its actions. In doing so, the research combines 
Granovetter’s (ibid) work with institutional theory, in order to show the complex interplay that exists 
between institutions and stakeholders, with the most powerful stakeholders able to shape 
institutional logics and societal discourse (Herold et al., 2019). As with all institutional design, this leads 
to accidental dysfunction in the logics (Popov et al., 2016), but in the case of Vietnam also deliberate 
dysfunction designed to exclude the socially disadvantaged. Indeed, by limiting the legitimacy and 
social action (Suchman, 1995; Weber, 1978) of the villagers and farmers included in these case-
studies, the Vietnamese government is able to retain control of the social innovation ecosystem 
(Gamble, 2011). The result is the constraint of bottom-up social innovation, and hence the reduction 
in impact from said innovations (Kruse et al., 2014).
The government-supported incubator systems studied are seemingly a necessary accommodation for 
investors looking for additional protection and support whilst navigating the new Vietnamese 
economy. However, whilst incubators have been able to build relationships with financially strong 
partners and create knowledge-sharing networks for the enterprises involved in the systems, it has 
had an impact on the country’s wider social enterprise environment. The inability to prove that a 
financier will be able to get a strong return on any investment, excludes them from the incubator 
system and alienates them from any related networking opportunity. With the incubator taking 
responsibility for the ‘business’ side of the relationship they have with the involved enterprises, there 
is little up-skilling of the owners, meaning that the ‘novel’ information (how to build networks, 
navigate the markets, and commercialise an idea) is not available (Yalcin-Riollett et al., 2019; Kooij et 
al., 2018; Sovacool and Drupady, 2012; Leal, 2011). The up-skilling of less knowledgeable partners has 
been a priority within other countries where actors have sought to create self-sustaining projects. In 
Panama, the school-parent associations were utilised in order to better preserve the project and 
encourage participation, whilst the outreach of partners working with groups in France and Laos is 
based on knowledge-sharing rather than the absorption of responsibility (Madriz-Vargas et al., 2017; 
Yalcin-Riollet et al., 2014; Leal, 2018).  This, it could be argued, is a result of the Vietnamese 
































































partnerships being built on a transactional basis with the incubators offering commercial support in 
exchange for technology suiting governmental priorities. This is the deliberately designed institutional 
dysfunction in action (Herold et al., 2019).
With the incubators being an extension of these governmental priorities, there is also evidence of a 
gap between social and political priorities, with the incubator not including the union in its discussions 
when seeking out new enterprises. Social enterprises often operate within this gap, as where 
community issues are not necessarily part of the government’s priorities, they actively seek to resolve 
problems they have identified utilising the markets and other available tools (Leal, 2018; Yalcin-Riollett 
et al., 2014; Kooij et al. 2018; Madriz-Vargas et al., 2017). However, in the Vietnamese context, 
enterprises operating outside of the incubation system could be seen as competitors, rather than 
potential partners, placing further barriers toward them getting political support. This support is 
crucial for all levels of the social enterprise environment in Vietnam, with political capital being the 
key to accessing further support.
Figure 2 below illustrates a systemic exemplar of the data presented in this paper, by demonstrating 
how access to weak- and strong-network nodes for the socially disadvantaged can inhibit or enable 
their ability to access resources and support for social innovations. At the macro-level the dominant 
stakeholders within the Vietnamese ecosystem (notably the government and international investors) 
emerge from competing paradigmatic discourses (state versus market) that create hybrid tensions in 
the ecosystem. These tensions are driven by state policy and discourse, as well as investors logics 
centred on profit and scalability. These tensions feedback into the state sector through market 
pressures, and the market through the social innovation products and services that do emerge. 
Conversely and despite these tensions, both the state and investors create the same coercive 
isomorphic tendencies through the support offered (political and financial) to incubators/unions for 
renewable energy innovations. The result are dysfunctional institutions constraining social innovation 
(Herold et al., 2019), both through accidental (Popov et al., 2016) and deliberate design. The state 
seeks to deliberately design these dysfunctions as a means to control the development of market 
forces and the types of social innovation that emerge, whilst the finance provided by the market (and 
permitted by the state) creates accidental dysfunctions i. . sustainable, but not highly profitable social 
innovations, are excluded. 
At the micro-level socially disadvantaged communities devel p social innovations, often with the 
support of social enterprises, as a form of bottom-up social innovation. Despite these bottom-up social 
innovations having the potential to be highly impactful (Kruse et al. 2014), the ultimate success of 
these innovation rests not on their efficacy, but instead on the strong and weak network nodes of the 
communities themselves. The weak and strong-network nodes required to gain access to institutional 
support (Granovetter, 1985; 2005) and the high power-distance (Puumalainen et al., 2015) that exists 
within the Vietnamese ecosystem, leads to the potential exclusion of disadvantaged communities. For 
those communities that do have strong network nodes, access to the incubators/unions is possible as 
they are trusted by political actors; but for those that do not have strong network nodes, they have to 
utilise their weak network nodes, which do not always lead to incubator/union access, and in some 
cases leads to innovation failure. Where innovation failure does occur6, the result is embedded 
disadvantage, as the communities see that they are excluded from sustainable community renewable 
energy platforms. This disempowerment reduces the likelihood of further bottom-up social 
innovations being developed, hence constraining community social action (Weber, 1978). Whilst the 
social enterprises discussed in this paper, and to a lesser degree the unions, can use their hybridity to 
overcome these tensions and isomorphic tendencies (Doherty, Haugh and Lyon, 2014; Douglas, 2015), 
the reality is that without access to weak and strong-network nodes within the state and market, such 
6 It should be noted that innovation failure can also occur due to the innovation being unviable (Popov et al., 
2016). Failure cannot purely be attributed to social networks and institutional design.
































































solutions are doomed to remain small-scale and limited in their sustainability, as the social 
entrepreneurs and communities are unable to reshape institutional logics and ecosystem conditions 
in their favour. Without social innovations that can empower people to drive their own change (and 
recognise their empowerment), either as social entrepreneurs or more broadly as social innovators, 
truly innovative bottom-up change cannot occur (Mulgan, 2019).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Conclusion
In summary, this paper has sought to show how bottom-up social innovation is constrained within 
one-party state, transitioning economies through the deliberate creation of institutional 
environments by d minant stakeholders. The resultant institutional dysfunction excludes the socially 
disadvantaged from becoming social innovators and leaves them disempowered and disenfranchised. 
This paper makes an original contribution to knowledge by showing how social innovation, and 
specifically social enterprise, are constrained in transitioning economies, particularly those with high 
degrees of centralised political control. By placing this within a framework centred on institutional 
theory and stakeholder network theory, the paper also seeks to show how institutional logics and 
stakeholder networks shape and reshape each other in social innovation ecosystems. Whilst the 
research is focused on community energy innovation and takes place in only one country, we believe 
that the emergent themes have applications globally in understanding how to better shape bottom-
up led social innovation. Nevertheless, further research that could empirically test this theoretical 
approach across a number of transitioning economy ecosystems would further develop scholarly 
understanding in this area.
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Interviewee ID Location Research Conducted
Energy Social Enterprise CEO SE1 Hanoi Floating Village Interview, Observation
Eco-Tourism Enterprise CEO SE2 Hanoi Floating Village Interview, Observation
Village Elder V02 Hanoi Floating Village Interview







University in Hanoi Focus Group
Social Incubator Investor I02 University in Hanoi Observation
Member of Cat Ba Management 
board
G02 Cat Ba Island Interview, 
Observation, Tour
Representative of local government G01 Cat Ba Island Observation
3 x Biogas Pig Farmers F01
F02
F03
Cat Ba Island Interviews, 
Observation
Former Biogas Pig F rmer F04 Cat Ba Island Interview
3 x Floating Farmers F05
F06
F07
Cat Ba Island Interview, Observation
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